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Abstract
In a bid to limit the harm caused by ubiquitous remotely
exploitable software vulnerabilities, the computer sys-
tems security community has proposed primitives to al-
low execution of application code with reduced privilege.
In this paper, we identify and address the vital and largely
unexamined problem of how to structure implementa-
tions of cryptographic protocols to protect sensitive data
despite exploits. As evidence that this problem is poorly
understood, we first identify two attacks that lead to
disclosure of sensitive data in two published state-of-
the-art designs for exploit-resistant cryptographic proto-
col implementations: privilege-separated OpenSSH, and
the HiStar/DStar DIFC-based SSL web server. We then
describe how to structure protocol implementations on
UNIX- and DIFC-based systems to defend against these
two attacks and protect sensitive information from dis-
closure. We demonstrate the practicality and generality
of this approach by applying it to protect sensitive data
in the implementations of both the server and client sides
of OpenSSH and of the OpenSSL library.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are entrusted to preserve the in-
tegrity and secrecy of sensitive data as it traverses a net-
work. While these protocols incorporate strong mecha-
nisms to defend against in-network eavesdropping and
modification of data in transit, such protocols function
in today’s distributed systems only as imperfect, human-
written software. Clearly, the desired outcome for secure
system designers implementing a secure data transfer
protocol like SSH [13] or SSL/TLS [4] is end-to-end in-
tegrity and secrecy for sensitive data, despite not only in-
network threats, but also threats that may arise from the
behavior of the protocol implementation(s) at the ends of
the wire. The dismal past two decades of remotely ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities in software deployed widely on
network-attached hosts are thus real cause for alarm—
even if the abstract design of a cryptographic protocol is
correct, the protocol’s very implementation is a worry-
ingly weak link in achieving end-to-end security goals.
In the quest for a lasting end-to-end defense for sen-
sitive data against disclosure or corruption by a remote
attacker, whatever vulnerabilities and exploits come to
light in the future, the systems research community has
in recent years sought to put the venerable principle of
least privilege [10] into better practice in the software
running on network-connected servers. This design tenet
dictates that the programmer should partition his code
into compartments, each of which executes a portion of
the program with minimal privilege necessary to carry
out its function. Here, privilege corresponds to access
rights for system resources: to read or write the filesys-
tem, memory, or network, to invoke a system call, &c.
In the context of exploitable vulnerabilities and sensitive
information, least privilege amounts to designing an ap-
plication with the expectation that exploits will occur, but
limiting the harm that they may cause by restricting the
actions that an attacker may take post-exploit.
Early work [5, 9] explored how to minimize priv-
ilege on compartments instantiated as standard UNIX
processes. More recently, the community has devoted
considerable effort to providing various operating system
primitives intended to make it easier for programmers to
adhere to the principle of least privilege. These primitives
range from operating system support for decentralized
information flow control (DIFC) [6, 12, 14, 15], which
limits the privileges of any compartment exposed to sen-
sitive information, to process-like primitives that lessen
the likelihood of accidental propagation of privileges be-
tween compartments against the programmer’s intent [2].
While these results all represent important advances
over the prior state of the art, we believe that proposals
to date for new primitives to encourage programmers’
adherence to least privilege largely ignore a central, vi-
tal question: how should a programmer structure code
and limit privilege to prevent disclosure or corruption of
sensitive data by an attacker who can exploit a vulner-
ability? Regardless of the primitives used, this daunting
question looms. To their credit, the proposers of these
primitives present examples of how to structure applica-
tion code to use them. But these examples are typically
offered as existential evidence that the primitives them-
selves are useful; no guidance or principles are offered
for how one may structure an application’s code to use
the primitives and robustly provide the desired end-to-
end secrecy and/or integrity guarantees.
Moreover, the structures of these example applica-
tions are complex, as they are typically split into many
compartments. To wit, the OKWS web server spreads
its code among at least 5 compartments (processes) [5],
the sthread-partitioned Apache/SSL web server consists
of 9 compartments (sthreads and callgates) [2], and the
HiStar/DStar-labeled Apache/SSL web server consists
of 7 compartments (processes) [15]. Each application’s
many compartments are configured with different privi-
leges and labels, respectively, and interconnected in com-
plex patterns. Structuring code to use these primitives ap-
pears difficult. Indeed, as we show in Section 3, even
highly security-conscious programmers using state-of-
the-art techniques [9, 15] have not adequately considered
how to defend cryptographic protocol implementations
from exploit-based attacks.
In this paper, we offer a practical improvement over
the status quo: principles to guide programmers in struc-
turing cryptographic protocol implementations so as to
robustly protect sensitive user data end-to-end, including
in cases where a remote attacker exploits untrusted ap-
plication code. Our contributions include:
• We define two general classes of attack on cryp-
tographic protocol implementations: session key dis-
closure attacks and oracle attacks. We demonstrate
that two state-of-the-art cryptographic protocol imple-
mentations, one in privilege-separated OpenSSH [9]
and the other in a DIFC-labeled Apache/SSL web
server [15], are vulnerable to these attacks.
• We provide protocol-agnostic principles for structur-
ing cryptographic protocol implementations to protect
sensitive data against disclosure and corruption when
an exploitable vulnerability is present in code that pro-
cesses network input.
• As evidence of the practicality and generality of these
principles, we present restructured implementations of
the OpenSSH server and client and of the OpenSSL
library that limit privilege so as to protect users’ sen-
sitive data from an adversary who can remotely ex-
ploit the implementation. This restructured OpenSSL
library can act as a drop-in replacement for the stock
library, bringing robustness against these attacks to a
wide range of SSL-enabled applications.
2 Background
We now summarize the state of the art in protecting sen-
sitive data in network server software. The two main ap-
proaches in use are privilege separation and decentral-
ized information flow control (DIFC).
2.1 Privilege Separation with Processes
In a monolithic application, in which all code executes
in a single compartment (under UNIX or Linux, a pro-
cess), all instructions execute with full privilege. Thus,
an exploit of a vulnerability may result in disclosure of
sensitive data, and more generally, grants the full privi-
lege held by the application to any code injected by the
attacker. Privilege separation [9] has proven effective in
mitigating these threats. This technique follows from the
observation that an application need not execute individ-
ual operations with the union of all privileges needed
by all operations during the application’s entire lifetime.
Many vulnerability-prone operations, such as parsing, do
not require access to sensitive information or the filesys-
tem. If we partition a monolithic application into com-
partments and restrict some compartments’ privileges, an
exploit in an unprivileged compartment will not be able
to disclose or corrupt sensitive information to which it
does not have access. Code that runs in privileged com-
partments, however, must be carefully audited to protect
the sensitive data it can access.
The privilege-separated OpenSSH server [9] divides
the server’s code into separate standard UNIX/Linux
processes. This partitioning includes a network-facing
unprivileged process that performs key exchange and au-
thentication protocols, and a privileged monitor process
running as root that exports an interface to the unpriv-
ileged process to allow invocation of privileged opera-
tions, such as signing with the server’s private key, veri-
fying user credentials, &c.
This structure is intended to deny the attacker execu-
tion of code with root privilege on the server; the at-
tacker only interacts directly with the unprivileged pro-
cess. Provos et al. state that “programming errors occur-
ring in the unprivileged parts can no longer be abused to
gain unauthorized privileges” [9]. This claim holds be-
cause the unprivileged process executes with restricted
file system access (enforced with a chroot system
call), and with unused user and group IDs of nobody,
which prevent it from tampering with other processes.
The SELinux security extensions to Linux [7], which
post-date Provos et al.’s work, allow enforcement of flex-
ible mandatory access control policies specified by a sys-
tem administrator. These policies support finer-grained
restriction of a process’s privileges than under stock
Linux, primarily by checking system call invocations in
the kernel against a per-process access control list. We
employ these extensions in our cryptographic protocol
implementations for OpenSSH and OpenSSL.
2.2 DIFC
Decentralized information flow control (DIFC), as im-
plemented in the research prototype operating systems
Asbestos [12] and HiStar [14], and retrofitted to Linux in
Flume [6], offers a different approach to limiting privi-
lege within applications. In these systems, a programmer
expresses an information flow policy by labeling data ac-
cording to its sensitivity level. Should an unprivileged
compartment access data labeled as sensitive, it becomes
tainted, and at run-time, the operating system prevents
it from communicating with compartments tainted with
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Figure 1: HiStar-labeled SSL web server. We omit SSLd’s and netd’s
labels in the interest of brevity.
lower levels of sensitivity, or with the network or con-
sole. This way, an unprivileged compartment cannot con-
vey sensitive data out of the application. To allow output,
trusted compartments perform privileged operations on
sensitive data: they own sensitive labels, and are thus al-
lowed by the operating system to declassify sensitive in-
formation, stripping it of its sensitivity label(s).
Building on these DIFC primitives, Zeldovich et
al. present a state-of-the-art privilege-separated SSL web
server [15], shown in slightly simplified form in Figure 1.
Ovals represent code: shaded ovals are trusted, privileged
compartments, while white ovals are untrusted compart-
ments. A dashed arrow between compartments A and B
indicates that A may invoke an operation in B with argu-
ments and retrieve the result. Boxes represent sensitive
data. A solid arrow from data to a compartment denotes
that the compartment may read that data; an arrow in the
reverse direction denotes write access. Circles annotating
data items and compartments indicate labels; in the latter
case, a compartment is tainted with the label in question.
Finally, a label within a star denotes that a compartment
owns that label (and may declassify data labeled with it).
The HiStar-labeled SSL web server is partitioned into
several untrusted compartments to limit the effect of
a compromise of any single one. The major compart-
ments are per-connection SSLd, per-connection httpd,
and shared RSAd daemons. SSLd handles a client’s SSL
connection and performs key exchange, server authenti-
cation, encryption and decryption. httpd processes clear-
text HTTP requests; it uses SSLd to decrypt requests and
encrypt replies. httpd can obtain ownership of a user’s
label by authenticating with the trusted authd daemon.
Label ownership allows httpd to read the user’s data and
declassify it for transfer over the network. The trusted
netd serves as a barrier between the application and the
network. It passes only declassified data (with no label)
to the network.
3 Attacks on Protocol Implementations
The designers of cryptographic protocols like SSH and
SSL aim to provide end-to-end confidentiality and in-
tegrity for users’ data transferred during a session. When
applied correctly, both privilege separation and DIFC can
ensure that exploits of unprivileged compartments in a
protocol’s implementation will not lead to violations of
these properties. In this section, we present two attacks
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Figure 2: Session key disclosure attack against privilege-separated
OpenSSH server.
that violate the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
user data in two state-of-the-art privilege-separated sys-
tems: one in privilege-separated OpenSSH, and one in a
HiStar-labeled Apache-derived SSL web server.1
3.1 Session Key Disclosure Attack
The partitioning goal stated by the designers of privilege-
separated OpenSSH was to prevent attackers’ executing
code with root privilege. However, as we will see, that
goal is not sufficient to preserve the confidentiality and
integrity of the user’s sensitive data.
In prior work [2], we described an active man-in-
the-middle attack against an SSL-enabled Apache Web
server. This attack, which we term the session key disclo-
sure attack (SKD attack), is also valid against a privilege-
separated OpenSSH server. While in prior work we only
discussed this attack against an SSL implementation, we
now demonstrate that this attack applies against any pro-
tocol in which the two parties share a symmetric secret
key.
In the SKD attack, an active man in the middle com-
promises an unprivileged compartment on the server, dis-
closes the user’s session key, and can then decrypt the
sensitive data transmitted during the session. This attack
succeeds because the unprivileged compartment respon-
sible for key exchange and server authentication can read
the session key shared between the server and client. We
illustrate the SKD attack on Diffie-Hellman (DH) key ex-
change in OpenSSH in Figure 2. Here an unprivileged
compartment processes key exchange messages and in-
vokes a privileged monitor to sign a session ID with
the server’s private key (the privileged monitor is not
shown in the figure). The user-privileged compartment
executes with the authenticated user’s UID and provides
a remotely accessible shell.
The attacker begins by exploiting the server’s unprivi-
leged compartment. He relays all key exchange messages
to and from a legitimate user. The server and user com-
pute a shared session key, which the attacker’s injected
code sends the attacker from the compromised compart-
ment. After user authentication, the user transmits sen-
sitive data encrypted with the compromised session key.
Using the session key, the attacker can reveal the user’s
sensitive data, as well as inject her own commands and
obtain further sensitive information stored on the server.
Moreover, the session key also provides secrecy for user
authentication, so the password of a client using pass-
word authentication will be compromised.
The state-of-the-art, HiStar-labeled SSL web
server [15] aims to safeguard users’ sensitive data
from disclosure to other users. We note with interest
that because the designers of this cryptographic protocol
implementation did not consider the SKD attack when
structuring their code, this server is vulnerable to the
SKD attack in the same way that the privilege-separated
OpenSSH server is. Specifically, the untrusted SSLd
compartment computes a session key for a user’s
connection, but if an active man-in-the-middle attacker
compromises this compartment, she may disclose the
session key.
3.2 Oracle Attack
Next, consider the HiStar-labeled SSL web server shown
in Figure 1. Depending on the key exchange protocol in
use, RSAd signs either the ephemeral RSA key or the
public DH components supplied by the untrusted SSLd
with the server’s permanent private key. This signature
authenticates the server to the client. It is possible, how-
ever, to abuse the signing operation exported by RSAd.
Although a compromised SSLd cannot directly read the
private key, it can sign any data chosen by the attacker;
the attacker controls the SSLd compartment, and can in-
voke RSAd with any arguments she chooses. Thus, the at-
tacker can use a compromised SSLd to produce valid sig-
natures using the server’s identity. This example demon-
strates that simply putting sensitive data beyond direct
reach of untrusted code does not provide sufficient isola-
tion.
We name such attacks against a cryptographic proto-
col’s partitioning oracle attacks. Any trusted compart-
ment or sequence of trusted compartments isolating sen-
sitive data and exporting privileged operations to un-
trusted code can be an oracle. An oracle takes untrusted
input from untrusted code and returns the result of a priv-
ileged operation. An attacker can obtain sensitive infor-
mation by invoking the trusted compartment with ap-
propriately chosen inputs. SSLd is meant only to pass
RSAd an ephemeral key or the DH components for its
own current session for signing. But if an active man-
in-the-middle attacker compromises SSLd, she can sign
arbitrary keys and DH components and present them to
other users, and so impersonate the server.
We have further identified oracle structures in the
“baseline” privilege-separated OpenSSH server [9]. The
trusted monitor process exposes a private key-signing op-
eration to the unprivileged compartment for authentica-
tion of the server during key exchange. The unprivileged
compartment thus has an oracle for the server’s private
key, and an attacker who compromises that compartment
can impersonate the OpenSSH server, just as was de-
scribed for the SSL web server above.
While studying the SSH and SSL/TLS protocols, we
identified further oracle attacks. Digital signatures suf-
fer not only from signing oracles, but also verification
oracles, in which an attacker can force successful signa-
ture verification by supplying chosen inputs to a trusted
compartment performing this privileged operation. There
also exists an oracle where an attacker forces a set of
trusted compartments generating a session key to pro-
duce the same key used in a past user’s session; we name
this oracle a deterministic session key oracle. Forcing
reuse of a session key allows an attacker to replay mes-
sages from a past session. (This particular threat exists in
SSL’s RSA key exchange protocol.) Finally, encryption
and decryption oracles may allow an attacker to encrypt
arbitrary data and decrypt confidential messages.
3.3 Discussion
The SKD and oracle attacks are independent of the low-
level system primitive used to limit privilege; they appear
equally in applications built with privilege separation and
DIFC. These attacks are made possible by weakly struc-
tured cryptographic protocol implementations. The im-
plementation of a cryptographic protocol should guaran-
tee the same properties provided in the middle of the net-
work: data confidentiality, data integrity, and robust au-
thentication of the peers, even if untrusted compartments
in its implementation are compromised. Avoiding SKD
and oracle attacks requires subtle structuring of the im-
plementation of a cryptographic protocol.
The SKD and oracle attacks target building blocks of
cryptographic protocols. Risk of an SKD attack exists in
many cases where a session key and key exchange pro-
tocol are used. Similarly, oracle attacks are associated
with basic cryptographic operations such as encryption,
decryption, signing, signature verification, message au-
thentication, &c.
We next propose guiding principles for defense against
SKD and oracle attacks. Just as these attacks arise in
building blocks for cryptographic protocols, these prin-
ciples concern how to implement these building blocks
safely. We thus believe both the attacks and defenses ap-
ply to many cryptographic protocols.2
4 Principles for Partitioning
In this section, we define principles to guide the pro-
grammer when partitioning an implementation of a cryp-
tographic protocol into reduced-privilege compartments.
These principles allow preserving the key end-to-end se-
curity properties of the protocol, even when untrusted
compartments are compromised. Our principles are ag-
nostic to the underlying privilege-enforcement mecha-
nism. Thus, they may be applied in DIFC-based systems,
in privilege-separated systems based on Linux processes,
and in other systems. They apply both to the client and
server sides of cryptographic protocols.
Throughout, we assume that an attacker can compro-
mise untrusted code and execute arbitrary code in its
compartment, though only with the privileges allowed in
that compartment. In this threat model, if an untrusted
compartment acquires sensitive information or an at-
tacker compromises a privileged compartment, we pre-
sume she obtains sensitive information.
4.1 Two-Barrier, Three-Stage Partitioning
A cryptographic protocol typically shares a symmetric
secret key between two communicating parties, used to
compute message authentication codes (MACs) and to
encrypt data. A key exchange protocol confidentially
shares this symmetric key. In addition, in some applica-
tions, the cryptographic protocol must authenticate peers
to each other. Any authentication method that does not
rely on transferring sensitive data, such as public key
authentication, may be performed during the key ex-
change protocol, before a session-key-encrypted chan-
nel has been established. The SSL/TLS protocol fits this
model [4]. In contrast, password-based authentication,
e.g., as supported by SSH [13], sends sensitive data over
the network, and must therefore only authenticate after
the session-key-MACed and -encrypted channel has been
established. After authentication, an application is as-
sured of the remote principal’s identity, and can grant the
remote principal access to locally stored sensitive data.
We distinguish two attack models. The first is that of
the SKD attack described in Section 3.1, where a man-
in-the-middle attacker exploits a vulnerability in a client
or server application to obtain the peers’ session key. The
second attack model is that of an impersonation attack,
where an attacker exploits an endpoint and subverts au-
thentication in order to impersonate one of the peers.
In order to prevent these attacks, a partitioned applica-
tion should implement structures that we term a session
key barrier and a user privilege barrier. These divide
an application into three stages, as shown in Figure 3.
The first such stage, the session key negotiation stage,
performs the key exchange protocol. The second stage,
the pre-authenticated stage, conducts peer authentica-
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Figure 3: Barriers and stages in protocol partitioning.
tion. Finally, the post-authenticated stage processes user
requests. Within each stage, one untrusted compartment
handles network input and executes without privileges to
read or write sensitive data, while multiple trusted com-
partments execute with privilege to access sensitive data.
These trusted compartments export any necessary privi-
leged operations to the untrusted compartment.
Session Key Barrier The session key barrier denotes
the killing of the untrusted compartment that completes
session key negotiation and the subsequent spawning of a
new untrusted compartment (in Linux, a process) to con-
tinue execution in the pre-authenticated stage. We now
explain why this structure is necessary.
The untrusted compartment performing session key
negotiation (before the session key barrier) is the only
untrusted compartment in the partitioning of the crypto-
graphic protocol implementation that processes cleartext,
unauthenticated messages from the network. These mes-
sages (and exploits!) may arrive from an SKD attacker.
Thus, while the untrusted compartment in the session key
negotiation stage interacts with the remote peer to com-
pute the session key, it should not have read access to
the session key. In addition, any data that allows deriving
the session key, such as a private Diffie-Hellman compo-
nent (in the case of Diffie-Hellman key exchange) or a
pre-master secret (in the case of RSA-based session key
establishment in SSL) should be also considered sensi-
tive. All access to privileged operations with such data
should be provided via trusted compartments.
Because this compartment only processes messages in
cleartext, it does not in fact need read access to the ses-
sion key; only the next stage, the pre-authenticated stage,
which continues execution after the channel between the
two peers is MAC’ed and encrypted with the session key,
needs the session key.
Principle 1: A network-facing compartment perform-
ing session key negotiation should not have access to
a session key, nor any data that allows deriving the
session key.
Because the untrusted compartment performing ses-
sion key negotiation may be exploited, we cannot trust
the provenance of the code executing in that compart-
ment at the end of session key negotiation, and rather
than allowing that compartment to continue execution in
the pre-authenticated stage, where it would have access
to the session key, we kill it (i.e., kill the Linux process).
But why can’t an SKD attacker exploit the untrusted
compartment in the pre-authenticated stage? This com-
partment only processes input that is MAC’ed using the
now available session key. A would-be SKD attacker
cannot inject messages with a valid MAC into the chan-
nel, and so is precluded from exploiting this compart-
ment. We assume here that the MAC computation func-
tion itself, which processes network input, can be audited
and trusted not to be exploited.
Thus, both the MAC on the channel and the killing of
the untrusted compartment in which session key negoti-
ation has completed effectively erect a barrier between
any SKD attacker and the session key.
Principle 2: When enabling the MAC, a network-
facing compartment performing session key negotia-
tion should be killed, and a new one created with priv-
ilege to access the session key.
Principle 3: After enabling the MAC, there should be
no unMAC’ed messages processed by the untrusted
compartment.
Note that the “original” privilege-separated OpenSSH
server does in fact destroy the unprivileged compartment
after user authentication, but we require this be done
after key exchange. The “original” OpenSSH destroys
the compartment not for SKD attack-resistance reasons,
but because of a programming difficulty. In this imple-
mentation, the unprivileged compartment runs as user ID
nobody, but must change its user ID to that of the au-
thenticated user. Changing a process’s user ID requires
root privilege; therefore, the monitor kills the compart-
ment and creates a new one with the required user ID.
Transitioning to the pre-authenticated stage may re-
quire transferring state from the unprivileged compart-
ment of the session key negotiation stage to the unpriv-
ileged compartment of the pre-authenticated stage. As
this state comes from a compartment that may be con-
trolled by an SKD attacker, the pre-authentication stage
should validate this state’s sanity to prevent an SKD
attacker from passing bad state in an attempt to com-
promise the pre-authenticated stage. The same problem
arises when a privileged compartment accepts arguments
to a privileged operation from an untrusted compartment;
these arguments should also be verified to prevent com-
promise of the privileged compartment.
Principle 4: Any state exported from a compartment
performing session key negotiation and any untrusted
arguments passed to privileged compartments should
be validated.
We do not offer general techniques for verification of
untrusted state and arguments. However, in our parti-
tioning of protocol implementations, we employ pipes
for inter-process communication. Although marshaling,
unmarshaling, and data copies cost in performance, this
mechanism provides a recipient with an RPC-like expec-
tation of the format of the data it receives. These RPC-
like semantics ease state and argument verification.
The session key barrier is enforced when an appli-
cation switches permanently from communicating with
cleartext messages to MAC’ed messages. Some proto-
cols, such as SSL, however, can alternate between these
two types of messages. In such cases, the transition be-
tween the two stages should be performed after the last
cleartext message. However, doing so would require pro-
cessing messages MAC’ed and encrypted with the ses-
sion key during the session key negotiation stage, which
risks creating session key oracles! We address this prob-
lem with Principle 7.
Principle 5: A cryptographic protocol should not al-
ternate between cleartext messages and MAC’ed mes-
sages.
User Privilege Barrier The user privilege barrier rep-
resents any authentication method that can be used to
authenticate a peer before granting it privilege to ac-
cess sensitive information owned by a particular user.
This barrier prevents impersonation attacks, where an at-
tacker exploits an application to subvert its authentica-
tion mechanism. Authentication should be performed by
an unprivileged compartment that has no access to sensi-
tive user data. The pre-authenticated stage is protected by
the session key barrier, so this stage is not exposed to any
SKD attacker. However, it is crucial for the integrity of
the session key barrier that there be no unMAC’ed mes-
sages processed during the pre-authenticated and post-
authenticated stages. Without the SKD threat, the ses-
sion key is no longer sensitive information in the pre-
authentication stage, and it can be accessed directly by
unprivileged code. We allow the impersonator to access
the session key at this point because it is his own key and
does not correspond to any other user’s session. Success-
ful authentication transitions the application into the next
stage, the post-authenticated stage.
Today’s state-of-the-art privilege-reduced applications
implement the user privilege barrier as we require. How-
ever, monolithic, full-privilege applications perform au-
thentication in a privileged compartment. The privilege-
separated OpenSSH server performs user authentication
in an unprivileged compartment, and then the monitor
creates a new compartment with the user ID and group
ID of the authenticated user. The HiStar-labeled SSL
web server supports only password authentication, and
the unprivileged httpd daemon obtains ownership of the
user’s labels only after the user successfully authenti-
cates with an authentication daemon.
Some protocols authenticate peers without sending
confidential data, such as passwords. For example, the
SSL protocol’s handshake supports only public key au-
thentication methods. Such authentication techniques
can be merged with the key exchange protocol or per-
formed in cleartext after it. Thus, the user privilege bar-
rier can be established within the session key negotia-
tion stage omitting the pre-authenticated stage. This op-
timization is encouraged, as it reduces the number of
stages and compartments, and thus increases the perfor-
mance of a privilege-separated application.
Authentication that requires passing sensitive data en-
crypted with the session key cannot be performed dur-
ing the session key negotiation stage. If it were, the ses-
sion key negotiation stage would require a trusted com-
partment to decrypt sensitive data, and that compart-
ment would result in a session key oracle that could
be used to decrypt the user’s sensitive data. Moreover,
other trusted compartments would be needed to process
authentication-related sensitive data, because we cannot
allow untrusted code to operate with confidential data.
The post-authenticated stage executes in a compart-
ment with the authenticated user’s privilege; it acts
for the authenticated user and can access his data.
When we transition from the pre-authenticated to post-
authenticated stage, we need not kill the former, as it can-
not be exploited, given the MAC’ed channel precludes
SKD attacks and the authentication barrier prevents im-
personation attacks. Instead, we can change the privilege
of the compartment used in the pre-authenticated stage
to that of the authenticated user, and continue execution
with the code for the post-authentication stage.
We note that for some applications, the post-
authenticated stage may require further privilege sep-
aration. For example, an application may require ac-
cess to a centralized database where sensitive data be-
longing to many users is stored. In this case, the user-
authenticated compartment should be denied direct ac-
cess to the database, but a trusted compartment should
export access to the database. This privilege separation,
reminiscent of techniques explored in OKWS [5], pre-
vents a user from accessing other users’ sensitive data.
4.2 Oracle Prevention Techniques
In the previous section, we described how to implement
cryptographic protocols so as to thwart SKD and imper-
sonation attacks. Throughout the suggested implementa-
tion structure there is sensitive data accessible only by
trusted compartments, which in turn export privileged
operations to unprivileged compartments. As discussed
in Section 3.2, in all such situations, there is a risk of
granting an attacker an oracle for sensitive information.
For example, the session key negotiation stage de-
pends on confidential session key sharing. An SKD at-
tacker can use a trusted compartment as a decryption or-
acle to obtain a secret component of a session key. An im-
personator may replay authentication data from another
connection as an input to an authentication oracle and
pass authentication as a legitimate user. Clearly, we need
techniques to mitigate any oracles in these stages.
Entangle Output Strongly with Per-Session Known-
Random Input Network protocols employ random-
ness generated afresh for every session to defeat authenti-
cation replay attacks, where an attacker replays messages
eavesdropped from a user session to reestablish the past
session and repeat a user’s past requests. The server gen-
erates a random nonce incorporated into the session key
(in the case of RSA key exchange) or a fresh private DH
component (for DH key exchange) to make the session
key different for every session. We can similarly employ
this session randomness as a defense to counter oracles.
The output of a trusted compartment should not com-
pletely depend on untrusted input, so that an attacker will
not be able to replay past input to the compartment and
get the same deterministic result. Entangling the output
of a privileged compartment with a trusted per-session
random nonce solves this problem.
For example, Figure 4 demonstrates an approach
to preventing a signing oracle in a privilege-separated
OpenSSH server. We restrict the trusted monitor that im-
plements signing with the private key to sign only ses-
sion IDs that incorporate per-session random bits. A se-
quence of privileged operations performed by the trusted
compartment ensures that the server’s private DH com-
ponent is indeed included in the session ID. This way,
we entangle the output of the RSA signing compart-
ment/operation with trusted, per-session, known-random
input. Numbers within trusted compartments in Figure 4
specify the order of their invocation, and this order
should be enforced by the application.
With this oracle defense mechanism, the attacker can-
not mount an impersonation attack, as every signed
session ID will incorporate different randomness con-
tributed by the server, and will thus not be valid in the
context of any other session. Similarly, in order to pre-
vent deterministic session key oracles, we make sure that
the compartment generating the keys includes random-
ness generated afresh for every session. Moreover, per-
session randomness is crucial in prevention of signature
verification oracles; the data for signature verification
should also incorporate it.
Principle 6: To prevent oracles, entangle output
strongly with per-session, known-random input.
In RSA key exchange in the SSL/TLS protocol, there
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Figure 4: Prevention of private key oracle in OpenSSH server by en-
tangling output with per-session known-random input.
is the potential for a deterministic session key oracle at-
tack, where an attacker can produce a deterministic ses-
sion key by supplying chosen inputs to a privileged com-
partment generating the key. In particular, a session key
consists of two public components, per-session server
and client randoms, and a pre-master secret transmitted
encrypted in the server’s public key [4]. When generat-
ing the session key, these components are concatenated
together and hashed. The server decrypts the pre-master
secret using its private key before hashing it together with
the other components. If an attacker controls the server
random, client random, and encrypted pre-master secret
inputs to the session key generation function, he can feed
data eavesdropped from a user session to the privileged
compartment generating the session key and produce the
key that corresponds to the eavesdropped session. We
prevent deterministic session key oracles by ensuring
that every server-computed session key includes a trusted
server nonce produced and supplied to the compartment
generating the session key by a trusted source. This way,
an attacker cannot control the generated session key, as
each time it incorporates a different random nonce.
Obfuscate Untrusted Input by Hashing The SSL
protocol alternates cleartext change cipher spec mes-
sages with authenticated and encrypted finished mes-
sages [4]. A change cipher spec message signals that the
sender is about to enable encryption and authentication
on all subsequent messages. A finished message contains
a MAC’ed and encrypted hash of all previous cleartext
messages received by a peer during the handshake pro-
tocol. The finished message ensures that these cleartext
messages were not tampered with by an attacker.
To ensure that the session key barrier is enforced,
we cannot process cleartext messages in the pre-
authenticated stage. Instead we should process the fin-
ished messages within the session key negotiation stage.
However, doing so requires a trusted compartment that
performs session key encryption and decryption opera-
tions on behalf of untrusted code. This trusted compart-
ment is a session key encryption/decryption oracle which
can be used to decrypt user information and validly en-
crypt an attacker’s exploits or requests.
Our oracle mitigation technique provides the required
privileged operations (encryption and decryption with a
session key) and avoids a session key oracle by obfuscat-
ing input data through hashing. As the finished message
is an encrypted hash, a trusted compartment can be struc-
tured in the following way: it obtains data from an un-
trusted compartment, hashes the data, and then encrypts
the resulting hash. A privileged operation that hashes
data and then encrypts is not useful for an attacker, as the
attacker’s requests and exploits for the pre-authenticated
and post-authenticated stages will be viewed as hashes.
As for the decryption oracle, we do not return the
cleartext finished message to untrusted code. Instead, our
trusted compartment takes the verification data from an
untrusted compartment and performs verification of the
finished message itself. The result of this verification is
returned to the untrusted compartment. However, this
mechanism allows dictionary attacks, where an attacker
can guess the cleartext message by supplying the verifi-
cation data. Again, obfuscating the untrusted validation
data by hashing before comparing it with the cleartext
finished message solves this problem. This approach fits
the protocol because the finished message happens to be
a hash of all previous handshake messages. If an attacker
attempts to guess the cleartext requests, his guess will be
hashed first, then compared with the original message.
The hashing that we apply to prevent both oracles al-
ready is present in the SSL handshake. But the hand-
shake and our oracle mitigation technique use it for dif-
ferent reasons. The handshake requires the compression
and collision-resistance of a hash function, but our tech-
nique employs the hash function because of its non-
invertibility. Happily for us, the hash function provides
all the mentioned properties and does double duty.
Principle 7: To prevent oracles, obfuscate untrusted
input by hashing.
Last Resort: More Trusted Code The previous oracle
mitigation techniques require the availability of a random
nonce or a hash function. However, for those cases in
which a cryptographic protocol does not specify these
functions at a point in the protocol where there is the risk
of an oracle, we offer a last resort technique.
For an oracle to exist, a result of a privileged oper-
ation must return to an unprivileged compartment. It is
possible to avoid the oracle by making the output privi-
leged and restricting access to it in the unprivileged code.
Although this technique helps, it is not efficient, as a
new trusted compartment is required to process the re-
sult, and you may need to process the result of the new
compartment in the same way. Our last resort technique
may lead to a chain of trusted compartments, which in-
creases the trusted code base and requires more auditing
work. Moreover, to terminate this chain, there must be a
suitable condition for applying one of the previous oracle
mitigation techniques, or the last trusted compartment in
the chain must not produce any output.
Principle 8: To prevent oracles, as a last resort, add
more trusted code.
4.3 Degrees of Sensitivity
Cryptographic protocols often operate on sensitive data
of more than one class. As an example, one frequently
occurring class of sensitive data is that which must be
kept secret to ensure secrecy and integrity of data trans-
ferred within a single session, e.g., the pre-master secret
in RSA key exchange, the private DH component in DH
key exchange, the session key, the per-session ephemeral
RSA private key, &c. Disclosure of such sensitive data
results in violation of the secrecy and/or integrity of sen-
sitive data within a single session. Yet there is often an-
other class of even more sensitive data that must remain
secret in order to preserve the secrecy of user data in
many sessions. This class includes a server’s private key,
users’ private keys, and passwords that are reused on
many servers. The secrecy of such data is vital because
an attacker can use it to gain access to user data in mul-
tiple sessions by impersonating the server, or by using
users’ passwords to access many servers.
In a simple scenario like this one involving two classes
of sensitive data—that which is critical to one session’s
secrecy vs. that which is critical to ensuring many ses-
sions’ secrecy—mixing sensitive data of both classes and
code to manipulate data of both classes in the same com-
partment incurs warrantless risk. To see why, let’s devi-
ate from our threat model and assume that an attacker
can compromise trusted compartments. Now any vulner-
ability in code that manipulates sensitive data pertaining
to one session’s secrecy can disclose sensitive data that
could compromise secrecy of all sessions. Creating dis-
tinct compartments for data of differing degrees of sen-
sitivity (and the code that manipulates it) mitigates this
risk. Similarly, to prevent disclosure of one user’s data to
another, separate compartments should manage sensitive
session-related key data for each user.
Principle 9: A privilege-separated application should
manage a session with two separate privileged
compartments—one to operate with data related to se-
crecy of the current session, and one to manage data
that preserves secrecy of many sessions.
Isolating code and data in distinct compartments ac-
cording to their sensitivity often reduces trusted code
base size; the quantity of code with privilege with respect
to one piece of data decreases.
5 Hardened SSH Protocol Implementation
We now demonstrate these principles for preventing
SKD and oracle attacks by finely privilege-separating the
implementations of the client and server sides of the SSH
protocol.
Recent privilege separation and DIFC work focuses on
server applications, as they accept connections and can
thus be attacked at will. But the rise of web browser ex-
ploits demonstrates that client code is equally at risk. An
attacker can set up a public service and provide access
to it via SSH. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the SSH
client implementation, the attacker can obtain users’ pri-
vate keys, used to authenticate them to other legitimate
SSH servers. These keys allow the attacker to obtain or
tamper with the user’s sensitive information stored at
these other SSH servers. Moreover, as the SKD attack is
equally valid on both sides, server and client, protection
against it is equally needed on the two sides.
Throughout this paper, the baseline OpenSSH server
design we refer to is that of Provos et al. [9]. While this
OpenSSH server implements privilege separation, it al-
lows unprivileged code access to the session key (contra-
vening Principles 1 and 2) and to sign a session ID pro-
vided by unprivileged code (contravening Principle 6),
and thus is vulnerable to SKD and oracle attacks. We
show how to partition the server more finely to prevent
these attacks. But first, we focus on the OpenSSH client,
which to date has only existed in monolithic form, and is
thus also vulnerable to both attacks.
5.1 Hardened OpenSSH Client
The OpenSSH client runs under the invoking user’s user
and group IDs. Because changing the user ID to nobody
and invoking the chroot system call require root
privilege, they cannot be used here. Instead, we limit
the privilege of the trusted and untrusted compartments
of the OpenSSH client with SELinux policies [7], and
the SELinux type enforcement mechanism in particular.
SELinux policies allow us to restrict untrusted processes
from issuing unwanted system calls such as ptrace,
open, connect, &c.3 Our prototype supports only
password and public key authentication, and does not yet
implement advanced SSH functionality (tunneling, X11
forwarding, or support for authentication agents).
Our hardened OpenSSH client starts in the ssh t do-
main, defined as a standard policy in the SELinux pack-
age for the original monolithic SSH client. This policy
provides the union of all privileges required by all code
in the SSH client; i.e., an application in the ssh t do-
main may open SSH configuration files, access files in
the /tmp directory, connect to a server using a network
unprivileged
process
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Figure 5: Architecture of privilege-separated OpenSSH client. Shaded
ovals denote privileged compartments. Unshaded ovals denote unpriv-
ileged compartments. The last line in each oval denotes the SELinux
policy enforced.
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1) DH priv key = gen DH priv key()
2) DH pub key = comp DH pub key(DH priv key)
3) sess key = comp sess key(DH priv key,
srvr DH pub key)
4) sess IDi = comp sess ID(sess key, clnt version,
srvr version, clnt kexinit, srvr kexinit, ...)
5) sym keys = derive sym keys(sess IDi, sess key)
6) srvr pub keyi = verify srvr pub key(srvr pub key,
known hosts file)
7) verify sig(sess IDi, srvr pub keyi, sig)
Private key monitor
1) sig = priv key sign(priv key, sess IDi, user name,
service, auth mode, ...)
Figure 6: Privileged operations performed by the two client monitors.
Sensitive data appear in bold, and are accessible only by the monitor
compartment in which they appear. Untrusted parameters provided by
unprivileged compartments are not in bold. xi denotes that sensitive
data x is exported to an unprivileged compartment read-only.
socket, create a pseudo-terminal device, &c. We use this
domain to initialize the client application and connect to
the requested SSH server. At this point, the client has
not yet processed any data from the server. Before ex-
changing any SSH protocol messages, the client creates
two new processes (compartments): a privileged session
monitor that performs privileged operations on sensitive
data that can compromise only a single SSH session,
and a private key monitor that performs authentication
operations with the client’s private keys. This ensemble
of three compartments (represented by ovals) appears in
Figure 5. The use of two distinct monitors is motivated
by Principle 9.
The session monitor runs in the ssh monitor t domain,
a domain we have defined that confines the process to
access only the known hosts file; to read/write UNIX
sockets for communicating with the private key monitor
and an unprivileged process running untrusted code (de-
scribed below); and to read/write a terminal device. The
session monitor cannot create or access any files apart
from known hosts, nor may it create new sockets. The
private key monitor runs in the ssh pkey t domain, a do-
main we have defined with a similarly tight policy, al-
lowing it only to read the user’s private key(s), with no
access to other files, nor privilege to create any sockets.
The private key monitor shares a UNIX socket with the
session monitor and only accepts requests from the latter.
After creating these two monitor processes, the original
SSH client process drops privilege to the ssh nobody t
domain. Untrusted code runs in this unprivileged process
and domain during the rest of the SSH client’s execu-
tion. The ssh nobody t domain allows the unprivileged
process to communicate with the session monitor and re-
mote server via previously opened sockets, but prevents
it from opening any new ones. The ssh nobody t domain
further denies all access to the file system, allowing the
unprivileged process access to the terminal device only.
The session monitor compartment isolates all sensi-
tive data that can be used to compromise the current re-
mote login session, and performs all privileged opera-
tions with these data, enumerated in Figure 6, that are es-
sential for key exchange and prevention of a private-key
oracle. When a privileged operation takes non-sensitive
data as input, the non-sensitive input is supplied by the
unprivileged compartment. Symmetric keys (sym keys)
are the keys derived from the session key for the MAC
and encryption/decryption. The session monitor enforces
the order in which an untrusted compartment may invoke
its privileged operations.
The private key monitor isolates the client’s private
key and performs signing operations with the key. Only
the session monitor may invoke these signing operations
in the private key monitor (over a UNIX-domain socket),
and it provides the session ID to be signed as an argu-
ment. We give a more detailed explanation of the private
key signing operation at the end of this section.
Session Key Negotiation Stage We now consider the
first stage of the hardened OpenSSH client, the session
key negotiation (SKN) stage, designed to thwart SKD at-
tacks (described in Section 3.1). In the SKN stage, an
unprivileged compartment—with the help of the session
monitor—performs Diffie-Hellman key exchange to ne-
gotiate a session key and authenticate the server. In ac-
cordance with Principle 1, we restrict the SKN stage
to run in an unprivileged compartment that cannot ac-
cess sensitive data—not the DH private key, nor the ses-
sion key, nor the symmetric keys (as shown in Figure 6).
Keeping the session key secret (and thus thwarting an
SKD attack) requires in turn keeping this data secret.
We must also prevent a verification oracle attack
against the client at this point in the handshake. Suppose
the attacker wants to impersonate a server to the client,
and can trick the client into connecting to a server he
controls, instead of to the bona fide server intended by
the client. Suppose further that the attacker exploits the
client. To authenticate the server, the client must verify
the server’s public key against the list of trusted public
keys in the known hosts file, and then validate the
server’s signature on the session ID. Once the attacker
exploits the client, if the exploited compartment of the
client implementation allows invocation of signature ver-
ification operation with the session ID or server’s public
key provided by this compartment then the attacker may
be able to force signature verification to succeed, and
thus spoof the bona fide server to the client. To see why,
note the arguments to the signature verification routine
verify sig() in the session monitor in Figure 6. If the at-
tacker controls the values of the signature argument and
either the session ID argument or the server public key
argument, he can provide inputs that will cause the signa-
ture to verify. That is, he can either sign a benign sess ID
with his own private key and supply his own correspond-
ing srvr pub key, or supply a bogus sess ID signed by
the bona fide server (readily obtained from the attacker’s
own connection to the bona fide server), along with the
bona fide server’s true srvr pub key.
To prevent this verification oracle, we must not al-
low an unprivileged compartment (at risk for exploit)
to provide either srvr pub key or sess ID to verify sig().
We thus perform signature verification in the session
monitor, and isolate sess ID and srvr pub key within
the monitor. In actuality, the untrusted compartment
provides srvr pub key to the session monitor, but the
session monitor validates it against the contents of
the known hosts file before verifying the signature.
Note that sess ID is entangled with trusted random bits
generated by the client every new session, originat-
ing from the client’s DH priv key via comp sess key()
and comp sess ID(). This construction, specified by the
OpenSSH protocol, implicitly applies Principle 6, which
further prevents an attacker from forcing sess ID to
match that from a past eavesdropped session.
We now turn our attention to the next steps taken by
the client. In the OpenSSH protocol, session key nego-
tiation and server authentication, which establishes the
user privilege barrier, are intertwined. Therefore, our par-
titioning of OpenSSH needs no distinct pre-authenticated
stage, and the SKN stage proceeds immediately to the
post-authenticated stage.
Post-authenticated Stage After computing symmet-
ric keys and authenticating the server, the client kills
the untrusted compartment from the SKN stage and cre-
ates a new untrusted compartment, also confined to the
ssh nobody t domain, to execute operations in the post-
authenticated stage. This new compartment is granted ac-
cess to the session’s symmetric keys so that it can per-
form encryption and decryption operations. It may in-
voke privileged operations in the session monitor, and
the session monitor can invoke privileged operations on
the client’s private keys by the private key monitor. To do
so, the private key monitor executes with the privilege to
read private key files.
In the post-authenticated stage, the server authenti-
cates the client. Our prototype supports password and
public key authentication. Password authentication does
not require any further partitioning of the client to pro-
tect against a malicious server, as the SSH protocol re-
quires that the client sends the password to the server.
However, we can apply fine-grained privilege separation
to deny the server access to the client’s private key(s).
There is no need for the untrusted compartment to have
direct access to the keys, and if it does, a malicious server
that the user logs in may exploit the client and obtain its
private keys, and thus obtain sensitive information from
other SSH servers where the user authenticates himself
using the same private keys. Therefore, we isolate the
client private keys from the post-authentication stage’s
untrusted compartment by placing them in a privileged
private key monitor. To prevent a private key signing or-
acle in the client, we do not allow the untrusted compart-
ment to directly invoke signing data of its own choice
using the private key. The untrusted compartment passes
untrusted input (user name, service name, authentication
mode, &c.) via the session key monitor. Note that we rely
on session key monitor to supply the trusted session ID
computed earlier in the key exchange protocol to the pri-
vate key monitor as shown in Figure 6. Recall that the
session ID has been entangled with trusted random bits
generated by the client for the current session. Thus, the
signature produced by the private key monitor will not
be valid in any session but the current one, and a private
key oracle has been disseminated.
To support session key rekeying, the unprivileged pro-
cess is permitted to invoke privileged rekeying operations
implemented by the session monitor.
5.2 Hardened OpenSSH Server
In accordance with Principle 9, we extend the baseline
privilege-separated OpenSSH server with an extra ses-
sion monitor process that handles sensitive data related
to a single user’s session while preventing an SKD at-
tack and both private key signing and signature verifi-
cation oracles, as shown in Figure 7. The private key
monitor is the original monitor process from the baseline
privileged-separated OpenSSH server, which performs
operations that require root privilege.
The session monitor, the unprivileged SKN process,
and the unprivileged process of the pre-authentication
stage all run in a chrooted environment with an unused
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Figure 7: Architecture of hardened OpenSSH server.
UID, under a restrictive SELinux policy that allows only
the system calls implied in Figure 7, and prohibits all
others, including dangerous ones such as ptrace and
connect. The process for the post-authenticated stage
runs with the UID of the authenticated user and is not
restricted with any SELinux policy, as with the baseline
OpenSSH server.
Session Key Negotiation Stage The session monitor
implements the privileged operations required for the
SKN stage, and we ensure that the pre-authenticated
stage does not start unless the unprivileged compartment
of the SKN stage terminates (in accordance with Princi-
ple 2). Because the Diffie-Hellman key exchange proto-
col is symmetric between the server and client, we im-
plement operations 1–5 from Figure 6 in the server’s ses-
sion monitor just as in the client’s. The SKD attack is
an equally serious threat for client and server; as both
parties share the same session key, an SKD attacker can
compromise either party’s code to disclose it.
During the SKN stage, the server authenticates itself
to the client by signing a session ID. The monitor in the
baseline privilege-separated OpenSSH server signs any
data supplied by the untrusted compartment, thus allow-
ing an oracle attack. A man-in-the-middle attacker can
interpose himself between a client and a bona fide server
and employ a signing oracle on the server to impersonate
the server by producing valid signatures on session IDs
corresponding to the attacker’s session with the client.
We prevent such attacks by constraining the private key
monitor to sign only data provided by the trusted session
monitor—specifically, the current session ID entangled
with trusted random bits provided by the server, as shown
in Figure 4, as suggested by Principle 6. The server’s ses-
sion monitor produces this sess ID in operation 4 in Fig-
ure 6, just as the client’s does. This signed sess ID can-
not be used to impersonate the server as it is only valid
within the current session. To perform the signing opera-
tion, the session monitor calls into the privileged private
key monitor and supplies the required trusted sess ID to
sign.
Pre-authenticated and Post-authenticated Stages
The baseline privilege-separated OpenSSH server sepa-
rates the pre-authenticated and post-authenticated stages.
It performs user authentication operations such as pass-
word verification and signature validation (in public key
authentication) in the monitor. However, this architec-
ture allows an SKD attacker to compromise the password
during password authentication, as it is encrypted with
the session key obtainable by the attacker. During public
key authentication, the untrusted compartment supplies
the data used for user signature verification, again allow-
ing oracle attacks against user authentication. The mon-
itor validates the signature against the session ID sup-
plied earlier when the untrusted compartment requested
the server’s signature on this session ID. Thus the un-
trusted compartment can control the session ID used in
public key authentication of the user. In order for an at-
tacker to impersonate the client, she must provide some
session ID signed by the client for the server’s verifica-
tion operation. It is unlikely that the attacker can force a
user to sign arbitrary data with his private key. However,
an SKD attacker can compromise the user’s session and
log its session ID and signature pair. She can then replay
these data to the server’s signature verification compart-
ment. Because the server’s signature verification routine
does not check whether the provided session ID is valid
within the current session, the verification routine will re-
port that the client has authenticated successfully. In this
way, the attacker successfully impersonates the user.
In our implementation, we fix this problem by making
sure that the session ID used for signature verification is
produced by the session monitor, as done in operation 4
in Figure 6, and entangled with trusted random bits pro-
vided by the server. Our SKN stage also ensures the se-
crecy of user passwords by thwarting SKD attacks.
Discussion: Trusted Code Base Figure 8 compares
the trusted code bases of Provos et al.’s baseline
privilege-separated OpenSSH server and our hardened
OpenSSH server. The latter implements two monitors,
in accordance with Principle 9, and as described in Fig-
ure 7: one private key monitor that implements code re-
quired for user authentication and accessing the server’s
private key, and one session key monitor that contains
the privileged code for processing the sensitive state for
a user’s session. Consider operations 1–5 in Figure 6,
which are essential to protection against SKD and oracle
attacks. In our partitioning, the session monitor imple-
ments these five operations, while in baseline OpenSSH,
the untrusted compartment implements them.
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Figure 8: Relationship between privileged (shaded) and unprivileged
(unshaded) code in baseline and hardened OpenSSH server implemen-
tations.
At first glance, one might remark that our partitioning
therefore incorporates more privileged code than base-
line OpenSSH. But that assessment is flawed. Rather, the
sensitive state pertaining to a user’s session was incor-
rectly deemed non-sensitive data in baseline OpenSSH.
Hence, we show baseline OpenSSH’s untrusted pro-
cess as shaded—notation for privileged—because it is
already (albeit inappropriately) privileged to manipu-
late sensitive per-session data. Following the partitioning
principles we have offered leads to the correct treatment
of this data as sensitive, the creation of a new privileged
compartment that can exclusively manipulate this data
(the session monitor), and the reduction of privilege for
all remaining code from baseline OpenSSH’s untrusted
process (denoted in the figure as “unprivileged code”)!
6 Hardened OpenSSL Library
Toward demonstrating the generality of the partitioning
principles presented in Section 4, we have also applied
them to the SSLv3 and TLSv1 cryptographic protocol
implementations in the OpenSSL library. As partition-
ing in accordance with these principles requires a fair
amount of programmer effort, we found the OpenSSL
library a particularly attractive target; hardening the
library allows amortizing one partitioning effort over
a broad range of security-conscious applications. The
resulting hardened OpenSSL library is a drop-in re-
placement that renders any SSL/TLS application linked
against it immune to SKD and oracle attacks. We note,
however, that changing the library alone cannot ensure
that the application atop the library itself handles sensi-
tive data securely. For example, the Apache web server
reuses worker processes across requests submitted by
different users. If an attacker exploits a worker process,
he may be able to obtain sensitive data belonging to the
next user whose request is handled by that process.
We finely partition both the client and server
sides of OpenSSL. Our implementation supports RSA,
ephemeral RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, client and server authentication,
and session caching. The OpenSSL partitioning is in fact
similar in structure to that of SSH, as these protocols
protect against similar threat models. When an applica-
tion invokes SSL accept (on the server) or SSL connect
(on the client), we instantiate private key monitor, session
key monitor, and unprivileged SKN compartments. Our
implementation scrubs the server’s private key from the
session key monitor process and the unprivileged SKN
compartment before reading any input from the network.
Within the SKN stage, we apply the same principles and
mechanisms as we did to OpenSSH to prevent SKD and
oracle attacks. As SSL/TLS supports only public key au-
thentication, its partitioning omits the pre-authentication
stage. We apply simple SELinux policies (whose details
we elide in the interest of brevity) to limit the privilege of
the untrusted SKN compartment and the session monitor
in applications that do not run as root. When the SKN
stage completes, the unprivileged compartment and ses-
sion monitor are terminated, and execution continues in
the application’s fully privileged compartment. The pri-
vate key monitor preserves the privileges of the appli-
cation before entering the SSL accept and SSL connect
library calls. Therefore, this compartment continues exe-
cution of the application’s code and can use the symmet-
ric key computed during the SSL handshake to perform
MAC and encryption/decryption operations on the estab-
lished SSL/TLS session.
We have tested this hardened OpenSSL library with
a number of client-side and server-side applications,
including the server and client sides of stunnel, the
mutt and mailx mail agents (for IMAP and POP3 over
SSL/TLS), the dovecot IMAP and POP3 server, the
client and server sides of the sendmail mail transfer agent
(for SMTP over SSL/TLS), and the Apache HTTPS
server (versions 1.3.19 and 2.2.14).
Converting most of these applications was straight-
forward; it merely required replacing the OpenSSL li-
brary and making a one-line change to the application’s
SELinux policy, without any application code modifica-
tions. Apache, however, required code modifications—
not to protect against SKD and oracle attacks, which the
partitioned OpenSSL library defends against, but to pro-
tect sensitive data after the SSL handshake completes. As
noted above, Apache reuses worker processes to serve
successive users’ requests. We modified Apache to en-
force inter-user isolation: to ensure that an attacker’s ex-
ploit of a worker cannot disclose the sensitive data of
the next user to connect to the same worker. We com-
pare two implementations of this isolation. The first is a
naive one in which Apache kills a worker after it serves
one request and forks another to replace it. As the over-
head of fork is significant, we compare against an op-
timized implementation based on checkpoint-restore, as
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Figure 9: Latency of operations in OpenSSH 5.2p1 client/server, mailx
12.4, dovecot 1.2.10, and sendmail client 8.14.4 using baseline and
hardened OpenSSL 0.8.9k library. Run on Dell desktop with 1.86 GHz
Intel Core 2 6300 CPU and 1 GB RAM running Linux 2.6.30.
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Figure 10: Throughput of sendmail server 8.14.4 and indicated com-
bination of Apache web server (httpd) 2.2.14 with OpenSSL 0.8.9k li-
brary. Run on Sun X4100 server with 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron 248 CPU
and 2 GB RAM under Linux 2.6.32.
proposed by Bittau [1]. In this approach, Apache takes
a snapshot of each new worker process’s pristine mem-
ory image before it serves any requests, and after each
request, a trusted monitor process restores the worker’s
memory image to this pristine state.
With or without this unrelated application-level
change, Apache 1.3.19 and 2.2.14 run with the hardened
OpenSSL library as a drop-in replacement for the stock
OpenSSL library.
7 Evaluation
We now consider the cost of defending against SKD
and oracle attacks in cryptographic protocol implemen-
tations. As the principles given in Section 4 demand ad-
ditional isolation between code and data, and thus addi-
tional processes, performance is a concern: both process
creation and context switches incur overhead. To explore
the extent of these overheads, we compare the perfor-
mance of the baseline OpenSSH and OpenSSL-enabled
applications with that of the implementations hardened
in accordance with the principles we have propounded.
We consider in turn the end-to-end metrics of operation
latency (important to users) and server-side throughput
(important to server operators).
Figure 9 compares operation latencies for a range
of applications. Each application is either client-side or
server-side; in each case, the complementary remote peer
runs the baseline cryptographic protocol implementa-
tion. All connections are made over the loopback inter-
face to a locally running server. For OpenSSH, we report
the latency of logging into an SSH server using public
key authentication and running the exit command. The
remaining applications use the OpenSSL library. For the
mailx email client and dovecot IMAP server, we measure
the time required for the client to connect over SSL/TLS,
check for new mail, and exit. For the sendmail client, we
measure the time required to connect and send a one-line
email to a sendmail server over SSL/TLS. For these ap-
plications, the latency a user perceives does not increase
significantly between the baseline and hardened crypto-
graphic protocol implementations.
In Figure 10, we consider the throughput achieved by
an SSL/TLS-enabled sendmail server and HTTPS server,
both based on the OpenSSL library. For the sendmail
server, we submit emails over SSL/TLS from multiple
clients and report the maximum load the server can sus-
tain in requests (emails) per second. Introducing oracle
and SKD defenses into the OpenSSL library negligbly
affects the sendmail server’s throughput.
To determine the maximum load the Apache (httpd)
web server can sustain, we increase the number of clients
requesting a small static page over HTTPS until the num-
ber of requests served per second reaches a maximum.
Clients make new SSL/TLS connections for each re-
quest. As noted in Section 6, apart from adding defenses
against SKD and oracle attacks, we further modified the
baseline Apache implementation to isolate users who
successively connect to the same worker from one an-
other. To distinguish the cost of inter-user isolation from
that of defending against SKD and oracle attacks, we
measure the throughput of several Apache implemen-
tations: baseline Apache, in which workers are reused
across requests, so users are not mutually isolated; a
hardened Apache with inter-user isolation implemented
with one fork per request, without oracle or SKD attack
defenses; and a hardened Apache with inter-user isola-
tion implemented with three forks per request, with
oracle and SKD attack defenses. To explore the role
of isolation primitives in performance, we also imple-
mented versions of hardened Apache that use optimized
checkpoint-restore primitives [1] rather than fork. We
further consider Apache’s performance in two extremes
of operation: when no SSL sessions are cached and when
all sessions are cached. We configure HTTPS clients to
use RSA key exchange when establishing an SSL/TLS
session because this protocol is less computationally in-
tensive for the server than ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, and thus better exposes the overhead of hard-
ening.
Returning to Figure 10, let us first consider the work-
load in which no SSL/TLS sessions are cached, running
on the hardened versions of Apache implemented using
checkpoint-restore. End-to-end, the version of Apache
providing both inter-user isolation and defenses from or-
acle and SKD attacks achieves more than half (55%) the
throughput of baseline Apache, which provides none of
these security benefits. The overhead of these security
mechanisms is masked in part by the computational costs
of the cryptographic operations required to establish a
new SSL/TLS session. We note that this “fully” hardened
version of Apache achieves over 70% the throughput of
one that provides inter-user isolation with checkpoint-
restore but omits oracle and SKD attack defenses—so
for this workload using these isolation primitives, oracle
and SKD attack defenses incur only moderate overhead.
In the workload in which no SSL/TLS sessions are
cached, there are no public-key cryptographic opera-
tions, so the overheads of inter-user isolation and oracle
and SKD attack defenses are more exposed. Focusing on
the implementations built on checkpoint-restore, Apache
with inter-user isolation (but without oracle/SKD de-
fenses) achieves 60% of the throughput of baseline
Apache; this reduction is the cost of inter-user isola-
tion. Adding oracle and SKD defenses to the inter-user-
isolated implementation further reduces throughput by
60%; that is the incremental cost of oracle and SKD de-
fenses on this challenging workload. End-to-end, this last
version of Apache, which incorporates all defenses and
inter-user isolation, achieves only about one quarter of
the throughput of baseline Apache (which lacks any of
these security enhancements). We stress that while this
throughput reduction is significant, it represents atypi-
cally worst-case behavior: all sessions cached (never the
case) and static content. On servers that distribute dy-
namically generated content, the overhead of protecting
users’ sensitive data will be amortized over far more ap-
plication computation.
The original applications based on the OpenSSL li-
brary used single-process, monolithic designs. Harden-
ing against SKD and oracle attacks requires three pro-
cesses per SSL/TLS session: a private key monitor, a
session monitor, and an unprivileged compartment for
the SKN stage. Similarly, the hardened OpenSSH server
and client use four processes per SSH session vs. the two
employed by the baseline privilege-separated OpenSSH
server. Apart from the process creation and page fault
costs associated with fork and the memory copy costs
associated with checkpoint-restore, anti-SKD and anti-
oracle hardening incur overhead for additional context
switches and the marshaling and unmarshaling of ar-
guments and return values between compartments con-
nected by pipes.
Again for the uncached workload, consider the
throughput achieved by the full checkpoint-restore ver-
sion of Apache (all defenses) vs. that achieved by one
with the same full set of defenses, but implemented
naively with fork. Checkpoint-restore offers a 20%
throughput improvement over fork. While the end-to-
end cost of inter-user isolation and oracle and SKD de-
fenses is significant, the design of the underlying prim-
itives used to implement compartments, though beyond
the scope of this paper, appears to play a significant role
in determining end-to-end performance.
8 Related Work
Provos et al. describe privilege separation, which de-
nies enhanced system privileges to unauthorized attack-
ers who exploit an application [9]. They reduce privilege
in the OpenSSH server by partitioning it into an untrusted
process and a privileged monitor. Our work tackles the
different goal of preventing disclosure of users’ sensitive
data in cryptographic protocol implementations. This
goal incorporates preventing privilege escalation. We ex-
tend the partitioning of the privilege-separated OpenSSH
server to comply with this goal.
OKWS is a toolkit for building secure Web ser-
vices [5]. It employs similar privilege enforcement mech-
anisms as privilege-separated OpenSSH—processes, the
nobody user ID, and the chroot system call—to iso-
late distrusted Web services from the system they are
running on and each other. Our complementary goal has
been to protect sensitive data by hardening cryptographic
protocol implementations against exploit.
HiStar [14] enforces privileges on compartments with
labels and DIFC. DStar [15] extends this approach to a
distributed environment without fully trusted machines.
Zeldovich et al. partition an SSL server to mitigate the
effect of a compromise of any single compartment and
prevent disclosure of user data. However, as we have de-
scribed, it is possible to disclose users’ sensitive data
from the SSL server using SKD and oracle attacks.
The insufficient partitioning of the SSL protocol allows
these attacks. Our work is complementary to work on
DIFC systems: they are privilege-enforcement mecha-
nisms, while we provide guidance on how to structure
code for cryptographic protocols.
We first discovered an instance of the attack we have
generalized in this paper as the SKD attack during prior
work with colleagues on Wedge [2], a set of primitives
and tools for fine-grained partitioning of applications on
Linux. While we presented an ad hoc defense for one
narrow instance of the attack in that work, we offered no
general characterization of it nor solution to it. By con-
trast, in this paper, we offer design principles that defeat
the SKD and oracle attacks and that we believe are gen-
eral enough to apply to many cryptographic protocols.
The partitioning principles and attack mitigation tech-
niques we have offered might also find fruitful use
in capability-based systems such as KeyKOS [3] and
EROS [11]. While capabilities provide convenient means
to restrict privileges, programmers need guidance in how
to apply them to protect sensitive data.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
We have described two practical exploit-based attacks
on cryptographic protocol implementations, the session
key disclosure (SKD) attack and oracle attack, that can
disclose users’ sensitive data, even in state-of-the-art,
reduced-privilege applications such as the OpenSSH
server and HiStar-labeled SSL web server. Privilege sep-
aration and DIFC will not secure the user’s sensitive
data against these attacks unless an application has been
specifically structured to thwart them.
The principles we have offered guide programmers in
partitioning cryptographic protocol implementations to
defend against SKD and oracle attacks. In essence, fol-
lowing these principles reduces the trusted code base of
an application by correctly treating session key mate-
rial and oracle-prone functions as sensitive, and limiting
privilege accordingly.
To demonstrate that these principles are practical, we
newly partitioned an OpenSSH client and extended the
partitioning of a privilege-separated OpenSSH server.
Further experience with the OpenSSL library suggests
they may generalize to other cryptographic protocols;
they are broadly targeted at protocols that negotiate ses-
sion keys and perform common cryptographic opera-
tions. While we hope these principles will serve as a
useful guide where there was none, we note that their
application requires careful programmer effort. Still, our
experience with OpenSSL shows that hardening a library
once brings robustness against these attacks to the several
applications that reuse that library.
The latency cost of defending against SKD and ora-
cle attacks is well within user tolerances for all applica-
tions we measured. Defending against SKD and oracle
attacks does exact a cost in throughput on a busy SSL-
enabled Apache server, however, reducing the uncached
SSL/TLS session handshake rate of a server that isolates
users by just under 30%, and the cached rate by 60%.
While that cost is significant, as our comparison of fork
and checkpoint-restore demonstrates, it depends heavily
on the performance of underlying isolation primitives—a
topic we believe merits further investigation.
Finally, while we have relied upon manual study of the
SSH and SSL/TLS protocols and their implementations
to discover the attacks we have presented, we intend to
explore tools that use static and dynamic analysis to ease
discovery of such vulnerabilities in cryptographic proto-
col implementations.
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Notes
1While we did not implement these two attacks, we present analysis
of the protocols and implementations demonstrating they are possible.
2While space limits us to illustrating these attacks and defense prin-
ciples in the context of SSH and SSL/TLS, we have found they apply
equally to IPSec, CRAM-MD5, and other secure protocols.
3Alternatives to SELinux include limiting a process’s privileges
with Systrace [8], ptrace, and chroot (though the latter requires
making a client application setuid root).
